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1. Introduction
Budding philosophers learn early that act consequentialism (hereafter, just consequentialism) has
surprising implications. For example, its de ning claim that, roughly, you may always do whatever
produces the best outcome appears to permit killing an innocent person if doing so will save others.
However, ‘New School’ consequentialists argue that surprising implications like permissions to kill the
innocent follow only from optional interpretations of the basic consequentialist framework.
According to them, consequentialism can mimic, for example, a so-called ‘agent-centered’ constraint
that forbids a killing no matter its outcome, forbidding killing someone even to prevent another from
killing that very same person and several more. If New Schoolers are right, very little about
consequentialism’s reliance on good shapes theorizing since it is consistent with agent-centered
constraints on acts. If that’s so, then we might understand all of morality through an evaluative lens.1
But the New School view comes with a catch. Constraints appear logically incompatible with
consequentialism unless we understand value in a particular way. New Schoolers assume that, “in order
to [mimic constraints], [they] must deny that agents ought always to produce the most good and
accept instead that each agent ought always to produce the most of what is good-relative-to-her”.2 This
2 Portmore (2007: 13). See also Portmore (2009: 330): “Of course, the rankings of outcomes will need to be
agent-relative (and, perhaps, also time-relative) in order to consequentialize certain non-consequentialist
theories.” Brown (2011) o ers a similar thought: “Some views of right and wrong are incompatible with
[agent-neutral] consequentialism, no matter what theory of the good one adopts.”
1 See Dreier (1993), Louise (2003), and Peterson (2010) for remarks in this vein. For further discussion, see
McNaughton & Rawling (1992), Brown (2011), Hurley (2013), and Schroeder (2017).
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commitment is costly. Critics allege that consequentialism’s compelling claim that you may always
produce the best outcome cannot mean anything like ‘best-outcome-relative-to-you’ since the latter is
agent-relative but the former is not — it is ‘agent-neutral’. Critics insist that New School
consequentialism is, therefore, not recognizably consequentialist.
As I argue below, the New Schoolers’ assumption is false. Agent-neutral consequentialism and
constraints are consistent. Standard-issue subjective consequentialism, which holds, roughly, that an
agent must do what will have the best expected outcome, is consistent with constraints. Expected
outcomes reconcile consequentialism and constraints because they are individuated by the agent’s
expectations or, more broadly, by her ‘point of view’. Expected outcomes are thus already
agent-relative, in a sense explained below. As a result, mimicking constraints does not require both
agent-relative conceptions of the good and expected outcomes. Expected outcomes alone su ce.
This paper has two main aims. The  rst is to show that agent-neutral consequentialism is
compatible with constraints. It turns out that the best way to achieve this aim is to hold that two
outcomes that represent the same event can di er in value. In particular, consequentialists who wish to
mimic a constraint on killing should hold that, roughly, presenting a killing in the de se or  rst-personal
mode makes it worse.3 The second aim is to show that this position is coherent.
The proposed view merits attention from even dedicated non-consequentialists for two
reasons. First, it illuminates how constraints are enacted in a moral theory. Second it shows how some
normative concepts, like good, are more plastic than is often assumed. As a result, the common method
of dividing ethical theories by their privileged normative concept — that is, by whether they
understand rightness through rules, reasons, rationality, value, etc. — does not carve at the deepest
joint in ethics. Rather, a more fundamental fault line lies between theories that take the ‘point of view
of the universe’ and those that take the agent’s point of view.
3 Perhaps, as Louise (2003) and Smith (2009) observe, temporal considerations force a parallel treatment of de
nunc outcomes. However, what I say for one can be extended to the other, so I bracket the issue.
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2. The Standard Recipe
Consequentialists characteristically claim that, roughly, you may always do what produces the best
outcome. No action is forbidden independently of its consequences. This claim con icts with the idea
that some actions, like killing, are intrinsically forbidden. I’ll call a rule that forbids you from acting
some way regardless of the consequences a constraint.4
To illustrate, suppose that a constraint on killing exists and that, as a result, you are never
permitted to kill, even in cases like the following:5
Mafia: The Ma a are certain to kill  ve innocent strangers unless you kill a sixth, which is
certain to stop the Ma a from killing the  ve.
The constraint implies that you may not kill even as the only means to prevent more killing.
Consequentialism, by contrast, appears to permit you to kill the sixth if doing so produces a better
outcome. Many  nd this permission heinous. As a result, there is considerable pressure on
consequentialists to look for interpretations of their view that forbid agents from killing in cases like
Mafia. New Schoolers allege that a ‘standard recipe’ o ers just this. It has two ingredients: a
‘broadened’ conception of outcomes and an ‘agent-relative’ notion of value.
Consequentialists often hold that an act’s outcome is the bounded sum of its downstream
e ects.6 New Schoolers, in contrast, conceive of outcomes more broadly. ‘Broad outcomes’ include not
6 If outcomes extend across the future without limit, knowing whether an act is permissible implausibly requires
knowing elusive facts about the distant future — see Lenman (2000) and Mason (2004) for more. I assume that
the outcome of, for example, refraining to kill someone can include the killing of two by others.
5 I’m assuming that moral dilemmas where, for example, you should kill and you should not kill, are impossible.
Suikkanen (2020) argues that moral dilemmas pose a special challenge to accommodating constraints in a
consequentialist theory. These arguments are orthogonal to my aims here.
4 I’m using ‘constraint’ to mean what Samuel Sche er means by ‘agent-centered restriction’. He writes that “an
agent-centered restriction is, roughly, a restriction which it is at least sometimes impermissible to violate in
circumstances where a violation would serve to minimize total overall violations of the very same restriction, and
would have no other morally relevant consequences” (1985: 409).
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only the act’s downstream e ects but also the act itself. For example, when I kill, the broad outcome
involves not only the fact that someone has died but also the fact that I’ve killed them.7
Broadened outcomes do not, by themselves, reconcile consequentialism and constraints.
Schroeder (2006) describes a case where each of Hans, Franz, and Jens must choose whether to kill in
order to prevent the other two from killing. I’ll represent the outcome where Hans kills as ‘H’, and
similarly for F and J. We can derive a contradiction from this setup if we assume that killing an
innocent person is always bad.8 This assumption implies that for any X and Y∈ {H, J, F} such that
X≠Y, X>X&Y, where ‘>’ expresses agent-neutral ‘is better than’ and ‘X&Y’ names the outcome where
X and Y kill.9 To mimic a constraint on killing, consequentialists must claim that, from Hans’s
perspective, J&F>H. That’s because, according to them, Hans ought not kill only if the outcome of his
killing is worse than the outcome of both Jens and Franz killing. But the parallel fact from Jens’s
perspective, H&F>J, proves a contradiction.10
Therefore, unless New Schoolers also employ ‘agent-relative’ value, where an outcome has a
value only relative to an agent, their view is inconsistent under plausible assumptions. I’ll represent
their asymmetric, transitive, irre exive agent-relative better-than relation using ‘>X’. For example,
rather than claiming that Hans’s perspective implies that J&F>H and that Jens’s perspective implies
H&F>J, New Schoolers instead claim that the agents’ di ering perspectives imply di erent but
consistent rankings: J&F>HH and H&F>JJ.
A central challenge for New Schoolers is interpreting the concept expressed by ‘>X’. It can be
taken to mean better-for-X, such that ‘J&F>HH’ means that outcomes where Jens and Franz each kill
someone are better for Hans than ones where Hans kills someone. The notion of something being
better for someone than an alternative is simple and familiar. Eating two bowls of ice cream is better for
10 Given Hans’s perspective, J&F>H. But H>H&F by the assumption. So J&F>H&F by transitivity. Likewise,
given Jens’s perspective, H&F>J. But J>J&F by the assumption. So H&F>J&F by transitivity. However, > is
anti-symmetric, resulting in contradiction.
9 ‘&’ does not express conjunction and is syncategorematic, saving me from inserting parentheses throughout.
8 I’ll drop the explicit ‘innocent’ quali cation going forward and implicitly assume that all killings discussed
below are killings of innocent people.
7 For suspicion about this idea, see Hurley (2017; 2019a; 2019b).
5
me than eating three. However, a moral theory that requires each to promote what’s good for them
seems like a kind of teleological egoism, not consequentialism.11 As Schroeder claims, “ethical egoists
do not believe that it is always permissible for you to bring about the most good. They believe that it is
always permissible for you to bring about the most of what is good for you. But since good and good for
express di erent concepts, the idea that egoists  nd compelling turns out not to be at all the same idea
that consequentialists  nd [c]ompelling.”12 Using better-for-X appears to forbid New Schoolers from
drawing on intuitive support for consequentialism.
New Schoolers can instead claim that ‘>X’ expresses a di erent concept, better-relative-to-X.13
However, critics argue that agents lack a pre-theoretic grasp of better-relative-to-X, so that talk of
better-relative-to-X makes as little sense as talking about orange-relative-to-X.14 Or it can be interpreted
in terms of what one should prefer, such that A >X B just when and because the reasons for X to desire
that A are stronger than the reasons for X to desire that B.15 But it’s unclear whether I always have most
reason to prefer what’s best.16
Perhaps independent reasons favour embracing a broadly agent-relative notion of value. I don’t
know. My thesis is simply that consequentialists don’t need it to mimic constraints. So I’ll momentarily
bracket discussion of agent-relative value to focus on a novel, alternative approach.
16 [redacted]
15 See Smith (2009) and Portmore (2011) for views defended along these lines.
14 Schroeder (2008).
13 Discussions of this concept include Hurka (2001), Smith (2003), Portmore (2007), Suikkanen (2008), and
Dreier (2011). For arguments that some axiology must mimic constraints, see Peterson (2010).
12 Schroeder (2006: 354). Of course, not everyone  nds consequentialism compelling — see Hurley (2017).
11 Portmore (2007) disputes this claim.
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3. De Se Consequentialism
3.1 Presentational Di erences Can Be Moral Di erences
Objective consequentialists characteristically evaluate, roughly, an action’s future e ects.17 Whether you
should press the button depends only on what happens once you do. This view has counterintuitive
implications. Even if all of your evidence indicates that pressing the button will result in an otherwise
avoidable  ery catastrophe and even if there is simply no reason to suspect that your pressing the
button has any moral upside, you should still press the button if doing so provides the best possible
outcome. This implication results from evaluating only the actual e ects of an agent’s action, which
obscures the potentially morally signi cant e ects of how the action appears from the agent’s point of
view, such as whether it is risky or reckless.
As a result, other forms of consequentialism attend to an act’s intended or foreseen
consequences, rather than to its actual consequences; they take the agent’s point of view. Very roughly,
what matters for some subjective consequentialists are actions’ expected e ects not their actual e ects.
Crucially, this shifts from thinking of outcomes extensionally, as actual future states, to thinking of
them from the agent’s point of view, as objects of attitudes like expectation, belief, credence,
anticipation, etc. As others, particularly Mahtani (2017) note, this grants subjective consequentialism
unexpected nuance.
To illustrate:
Lois Lane. Lois Lane has just learned the bad news: aliens are about to destroy the world. Worse
still, her cell phone has enough battery to make only one call. She can either call her friend
Clark Kent to come save the day or she can call her friend Superman. She knows Clark Kent as
the nerdy guy in the o ce. She knows Superman as someone who’s faster than a speeding
17 I’m using ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ consequentialism in broadly the manner of Railton (1984: 152). I’m not
the  rst to exploit the distinctive features of probability and expectation to defend consequentialism. Elements
of my approach are anticipated by Jackson (1991) and Oddie and Milne (1991).
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bullet, more powerful than a locomotive, and able to leap tall buildings in a single bound.
Unbeknownst to Lois, Clark Kent is numerically identical to Superman.
By adding some numerical values to this scenario representing Lois’s evaluations and expectations, the




Superman arrives to save the day. Clark arrives to save the day.
Lois dials Superman’s
number
(1) 10 utility at 99% likelihood
= 9.9 value.
(3) 1 utility at 1% likelihood = .01
value.
Lois dials Clark Kent’s
number
(2) 10 utility at 1% likelihood =
.1 value.
(4) 1 utility at 99% likelihood =.99
value.
From Lois’s point of view, while each friend is equally likely to answer the call, having Superman arrive
to save the day is better than having Clark Kent arrive. What should Lois do? Since no matter who Lois
calls, the same person is very likely to show up, objective consequentialism implies that Lois can call
either. But that’s counterintuitive. Given that Lois thinks of Clark as a mere o ce worker, calling
Clark would be a mistake when she could call someone who’s more powerful than a locomotive.
Subjective consequentialism rati es this intuition. Since by Lois’s lights Clark is a desk jockey and
Superman is faster than a speeding bullet, it’s better to call Superman than to call Clark.19
Clark arriving to save the day is metaphysically identical to Superman arriving. But they are
distinct outcomes for Lois because she regards them as distinct. These outcomes di er only in how a
particular presents itself to Lois — as an o ce worker in one case and as able to leap tall buildings in a
single bound in the other. Nevertheless, these merely presentational differences — di erences in how a
particular presents itself to an agent — clearly have moral signi cance for many subjective
19 Like Mahtani, I reject “naive referentialism about credence”. On the view that we favour, it’s possible to have
distinct credal attitudes towards distinct epistemic possibilities that are intrinsically metaphysically identical. See
also Chalmers (2011: 590) and Fitts (2013).
18 I’m using ‘utility’ as a catch-all term for the features of the possible state-of-a airs represented by an outcome
that contribute to the outcome’s value. An outcome’s value is (partly) a function of its expected utility.
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consequentialists since they explain why Lois should call Superman and not Clark Kent.
A second presentational di erence is particularly signi cant. Just as Clark and Superman are
identical, the referent of ‘I’, in my use, and the referent of ‘the actual author of this article’ (@AU) are
identical. And just as (merely epistemic) possibilities involving Superman can misleadingly present
themselves as involving only an o ce worker and not a superhuman alien, possibilities involving @AU
can misleadingly present themselves as involving only her and not me. For example, I can entertain
what thrilling turns my life might have taken had I not been the actual author of this article. Likewise, I
can imagine someone else, apparently distinct from me, writing it.
Now, if the presentational di erences between Lois’s Superman possibilities and her Clark
Kent possibilities can ground evaluative di erences, we cannot be surprised when the presentational
di erence between me myself and someone else (who happens to be me) also makes an evaluative
di erence. To illustrate, suppose that the local grocery store has selected you and several others to win a
month’s worth of groceries. The prize merely compounds your luck: you are extremely well o , having
bene ted from a generous inheritance. You line up in one of the two queues formed to distribute the
prizes. As you progress, only you and a woman in the adjacent queue remain. You are then informed
that, owing to a clerical error, only one prize is left. You wonder whether you or the woman would
bene t more from the prize. Because you are likely better o  than her, you reason that she would
probably bene t more from receiving the prize. So you judge it better that she receives it and that you
should, therefore, decline the prize. But, twist of fate, you failed to recognize yourself in the mirror:
you were her all along.
Prior to recognizing that you are the woman next to you, the kind of subjective
consequentialism that we are considering implies that the outcome where you receive the prize has less
value than the outcome where the woman receives it. These two outcomes are distinguished only
presentationally. In one, you are “presented to [your]self in a special and primitive way, in which [you
are] presented to no one else”, the so-called de se.20 In the other, you are presented to yourself
third-personally in the impersonal mode: you are presented as a stranger to yourself. Outcomes that
20 Frege (1956: 298).
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involve de se thought — “de se outcomes” — can therefore di er in value from metaphysically identical
outcomes presented di erently.
Summing up, the standard recipe represents an agent’s point of view in her distinctive
evaluative standards or in the reasons that she has to prefer certain outcomes to others. In contrast,
some forms of subjective consequentialism represent an agent’s point of view in how the potential
e ects of her actions present themselves to her, not in how she evaluates them. These presentational
di erences can ground evaluative di erences between otherwise metaphysically identical outcomes.
Presentational di erences, as we will see, reconcile agent-neutral consequentialism and constraints.
3.2 Private Outcomes
A view that I will now develop, called de se consequentialism, employs de se outcomes to reconcile
constraints and agent-neutral consequentialism, demonstrating that they are consistent, contra
Schroeder, Smith, Portmore, Brown, etc. It requires two assumptions. First, it requires assuming that
some outcomes involve de se thought, following discussion above. For example, when I drink in order
to quench my thirst, the outcome that I intend by drinking — namely, that I myself quench my thirst
— is necessarily de se or essentially indexical. Likewise, when deciding whether you will get the prize or
whether the woman in the other line (who happens to be you) will get it, the  rst outcome is
necessarily presented in the de se mode since that’s what distinguishes it from the second.21
The second assumption is also defended in the previous subsection: that de se thoughts are
private. In de se thought, you are “presented to [your]self in a special and primitive way, in which [you
21 De se consequentialists therefore follow many philosophers in assuming that outcomes  gure in the
psychological explanation of action and that, as Bermudez (2017: 690) puts it, “psychological explanations are
essentially indexical”. The phrase ‘essential indexical’ of course traces back to Perry (1979), but defenders of the
thesis also include Castañeda (1971), Lewis (1979), Burge (2000), and Bermudez (2016). Cappelen and Dever
(2013) criticize the thesis. Babb (2016) and Bermudez (2017) respond.
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are] presented to no one else”. This claim is also widely assumed.22
Combining these assumptions, if some outcomes are de se thoughts and if all de se thoughts are
private, then some outcomes are private. For example, when Franz is deciding whether to kill or
whether Hans and Jens will kill, the outcome entertained by Franz where he himself kills is private. I’ll
use ‘IF’ to represent that outcome, distinguishing it from other presentationally-distinct outcomes
where Franz kills, such as F, the publicly-accessible third-personal counterpart of IF. Since an agent’s
outcomes, as we’ve seen, are partly a function of her thoughts and since only Franz is in a position to
think his de se thoughts, necessarily, IF is an outcome only for Franz. This makes IF private.
IF is essentially de se or  rst-personal; it is an outcome that only Franz can entertain. IF contrasts
with F which, as I’ll use it for the rest of the discussion, is an essentially third-personal outcome. Just as
entertaining IF requires thinking of Franz in a “special and primitive way” that only Franz can,
entertaining F requires entertaining an outcome not only where Franz kills but also where Franz is
represented as distinct from oneself. As a result, Franz cannot have F as an outcome unless he is
su ering from some kind of de se confusion. The moment that confusion lifts, he loses F as an
outcome since, necessarily, that outcome represents Franz as a distinct agent or, as I put it earlier, “as a
stranger to himself”.23
23 One might worry that known identities pose a problem for de se consequentialism. When Lois knows that
Clark is Superman, then she cannot rationally assign di erent values to her Clark and Superman outcomes.
Likewise, when someone knows that F and IF represent the same state, they must assign them the same value.
But, as we’ll see, mimicking constraints requires assigning those outcomes di erent values.
This worry is less forceful that it appears. Since only I am in the position think my de se thoughts, only I
am in a position to assign values to I@AU. When I know that @AU and I@AU represent the same state, @AU is not
one of my outcomes, since it is essentially a third-personal representation of myself. Just as Franz can have F as an
22 Bermudez (2016) denies that de se thought is private. According to him, “an account of the sense of “I” must
allow tokens of “I” to have the same sense as tokens of other personal pronouns such as “you” in appropriate
contexts” (79). However, Bermudez’s package of views o ers no succor to opponents of de se consequentialism.
Bermudez (2020) defends a notion of ultraintensionality, such that even if tokens of “I” can share a
hyperintension with tokens of “you”, they nevertheless di er in ways that allow those tokens to be evaluated
di erently, which is all that de se consequentialism requires. This shows that de se consequentialism relies on
weaker assumptions than those that I adopt above. I adopt them only to simplify exposition.
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Outcomes’ privacy is weaker than it may seem in at least two ways. First, though your
outcomes are private, they nevertheless permit publicly accessible explanations of your actions. This
follows from a more general observation about  rst-personal thought. Even if it is essentially private, I
can still grasp the de se thought expressed by your utterance of “I am thirsty”. Perhaps I grasp it by
implicitly grasping the rule that takes your utterance and its context to a Kaplanian content; perhaps I
grasp some other explanation. But whatever that explanation is, de se thoughts are not totally
inscrutable simply because they are private. By the same token, although de se outcomes are private,
they contribute to explanations of intentional action. For example, when we’re trying to explain why
Mark is drinking and I claim that it’s because he wants to quench his thirst, then my claim does not
fully capture the outcome that Mark desires. But it’s close enough that we can  ll in what’s missing
using extra-linguistic means.
Second, that outcomes are private does not imply the absurd proposition that an action a ects
only its agent or anything of the sort. That confusion rests on misunderstanding the meaning of
‘outcome’ in this context. ‘Outcome’, as I’m using it, is a consequentialist term of art, denoting the
bearer of value on which an act’s rightness allegedly depends. As such, even if an action’s intended
outcome is private, its e ects need not be.
Private outcomes reconcile agent-neutral consequentialism and agent-centered constraints
because their imagined con ict relies on certain outcomes being public. For example, on the standard
view, the total set of outcomes in Schroeder’s scenario is {J, F, H, J&H, J&F, H&F}. Jens’s perspective
outcome only if he is su ering de se identity confusion, I can have @AU as an outcome only if I’m similarly
confused and I can rationally assign @AU and I@AU di erent values when confused.
Some might insist that I can have @AU as an outcome even if I’m not confused because I can imagine
myself from a third-personal perspective while identifying with the imagined person. First, such thoughts have
long puzzled philosophers. It seems plausible that when we imagine ourselves third-personally, we are engaging
in the mere pretense that we are distinct from the imagined person. Or perhaps our identity is distributed across
two distinct perspectives. In any case, neither description seems to  t outcomes like @AU, which essentially
present their agents as distinct from oneself. Second, even if I can imagine myself third-personally while
maintaining the integrity of my identity, imagining @AU and having @AU as an outcome are two di erent
conditions. I’m concerned only with the latter. Observations about the former are orthogonal.
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implies that H&F>J and Hans’s perspective implies that J&F>H. Because we’re assuming that the
outcome where Jens kills (J) in Jens’s choice set (that is, {J, H&F}) overlaps with one that appears in
Hans’s choice set (that is, {H, J&F}), two instances of the principle that more killing is always worse —
J>J&F and H>H&F — combine to yield a contradiction.24
We can derive a similar result more informally. Jens absolutely must not kill only if H&F>J. A
constraint on killing therefore implies that J is extremely bad. But if J is extremely bad, then, plausibly,
others should sometimes kill in order to avoid J, which straightforwardly con icts with a constraint on
killing. Because J is part of at least two di erent agents’ outcomes, assigning J the value necessarily for
securing a deontic verdict for one agent may ensure the wrong deontic verdict for the other agent. The
contradiction falsely thought to demonstrate the inconsistency of agent-neutral consequentialism and
constraints thus depends on public outcomes.
De se consequentialism’s private outcomes, however, avoid this implication. Privacy limits their
deontic import to only the single individual whose de se thoughts constitute the outcome. For example,
because IF is only Franz’s outcome, only his actions are a ected by IF’’s value (or disvalue). Because the
deontic signi cance of de se outcomes is limited to a single agent, we can claim that IF is very bad indeed
without implying anything at all about what Jens or Hans should do (and similarly for IH and IJ).
Accordingly, private outcomes let consequentialists mimic constraints. De se consequentialism
implies that Hans’s choice set is {IH, J&F}, Franz’s choice set is {IF, H&J}, and Jens’s choice set is {IJ,
F&H}, yielding a di erent total set: {IH, IJ, IF, H&J, H&F, J&F}. Critically, since de se outcomes are
private, no de se outcome where an agent herself kills is part of a di erent agent’s choice set. As a result,
the total set of outcomes {IH, IJ, IF, H&J, H&F, J&F} can be ordered to mimic a non-consequentialist
prohibition on killing just so long as the de se outcomes are the worst possible outcomes. This
assumption yields the following ranking in terms of the agent-neutral better-than relation:
24 Recall that, given Hans’s perspective, J&F > H. But H > H&F by the principle. So J&F > H&F by transitivity.
Likewise, given Jens’s perspective, H&F > J. But J > J&F by the principle. So H&F > J&F by transitivity.
However, > is anti-symmetric, resulting in contradiction.
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H&J=H&F=J&F > IH=IJ=IF.25 According to this ranking, Hans’s choice set {IH, J&F} implies that
Hans should not kill since J&F > IH and similarly for the rest.
To be clear, I have not yet justified ordering outcomes in this way. I’ve merely shown that de se
consequentialism lets us do so, thereby squaring constraints and agent-neutral value, which is the
paper’s main aim. Whether we can justify this ranking on independent grounds and whether de se
consequentialism is an independently attractive view are further questions, which I begin to address
below. But I want to be explicit that articulating de se consequentialism as I’ve just done su ces to
rebut Portmore, Schroeder, Brown, Smith, Nair, et al. since it establishes that agent-neutral
consequentialism can be reconciled with constraints.
3.3 De Se Value
3.3.1 For all agents X, X>IX
De se consequentialism implies what I’ll call ‘de se value’, which is ordinary, agent-neutral value (or
disvalue), grounded in what’s distinctive about  rst-personal thoughts about killing (or whichever
other act is forbidden by a constraint). We can demonstrate this implication by adding the perspective
of a bystander to the case of Hans, Franz, and Jens. Suppose that Klaus is watching the three bicker
about who’s going to get their hands dirty. We’re assuming that every killing is bad. Accordingly, from
Klaus’s perspective, Jens killing one is better than Hans and Franz killing two, and mutatis mutandis
25 To avoid proliferating symbols, I’m not using ‘=’ to express identity but rather ‘is equal in value to’, the binary
relation between outcomes that holds when their value is identical. I should note that the ordering above violates
a stronger principle than the principle that killing is always bad, according to which two killings are always worse
than one: for any X, Y, and Z ∈ {H, J, F, IH, IJ ,IF} such that Y≠Z, X>Y&Z. But this principle is
straightforwardly inconsistent with a constraint on killing, since it entails that it is always better to kill one in
order to save two.
We might reasonably deny this stronger principle on independent grounds even if we are drawn to the
weaker one. The weaker principle does not make comparisons between the disvalue of various killings. It holds
only that killing is always bad. The stronger principle, by contrast, holds that two killings are always worse than
one. If we think that killings are not comparable in disvalue or that killings can di er su ciently in value, we
should reject the stronger principle regardless of our sympathy for consequentializing.
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for the rest. Klaus’s perspective suggests, quite intuitively, that H=J=F > H&J=H&F=J&F. However, if
we assume that H&J=H&F=J&F > IH=IJ=IF to mimic constraint on killing, transitivity implies that
H=J=F > IH=IJ=IF, from which we can extrapolate that for all agents X, X>IX — that is, de se killings
are worse than their third-personal counterparts. I’ll focus on de se value for the rest of the paper.26
De se value might seem puzzling: that an outcome’s presentation can make it worse is odd. But
this oddness o ers no objection to de se consequentialism. That’s because I’m not relying on
pre-theoretically plausible claims about de se value to justify an absolute constraint on killing in the way
that we might justify a particular policy by the number of people it helps. Rather, the order of
explanation is the opposite: I’m showing what a constraint on killing entails about the structure of
value in an agent-neutral consequentialist framework. Consequently, de se consequentialists might
agree that de se value is odd but insist that the evidence for agent-neutral consequentialism is so great
and that the intuitive force of a constraint on killing is so strong that de se value is worth embracing as a
genuine moral discovery, regardless of how puzzling it may seem.
As a result, I don’t need to show that de se value is plausible independently from our evidence
for consequentialism and constraints. I need only to show that it is coherent. However, one could
reasonably suspect otherwise, particularly given an initially compelling argument that I call the
Supervenience Argument. According to it:
1. X and IX represent the same metaphysical possibility.
2. The normative supervenes on the non-normative.
3. If X and IX represent the same metaphysical possibility, they are non-normatively alike.
4. (MP1-3, 2) Therefore, X and IX are normatively alike, so de se value violates supervenience.
26 Muñoz (2020) argues that intrinsic di erences between actions cannot ground moral di erences between
outcomes for consequentialists. One might worry that this threatens de se value. However, since, for example, J
and IJ are caused by token identical actions, moral di erences between those outcomes are not the result of
intrinsic di erences between actions. As a result, de se value is a ‘narrow’, not ‘broad’, feature to use Muñoz’s
terminology. Appealing to that feature therefore complies with the stipulation that only narrow di erences
between outcomes are moral di erences.
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I’ve defended (1) and I assume (2), so I’ll rebut the Supervenience Argument by showing how (3)
mischaracterizes outcomes, at least as the de se consequentialist understands them.
3.3.2 Representation and Supervenience
It’s natural to assume that evaluative di erences between outcomes wholly supervene on di erences
between the metaphysical possibilities that they represent. But that’s false: Lois Lane’s Superman
outcomes di er from her Clark Kent outcomes while being metaphysically identical to them. Hence,
it’s a mistake to treat outcomes simply as proxies for metaphysical possibilities. Treating them as proxies
collapses subjective consequentialism into objective consequentialism.
An analogy helps to diagnose the mistake behind the Supervenience Argument. It is natural to
think of, for example, @AU and I@AU as two di erent vistas on the same landscape. One vista might
provide a better view than the other, but that doesn’t make the landscape any more beautiful.
Likewise, it’s tempting to think that though the moral repugnance of a killing may be more vivid from
a  rst-personal standpoint, that doesn’t make the killing itself any more repugnant.
But de se consequentialists don’t conceive of outcomes in this way. Outcomes — an act’s
foreseen e ects — themselves are the bearers of deontically-relevant value, not the states of a airs that
they represent. Normative supervenience therefore implies that evaluative di erences between
outcomes necessitate non-evaluative di erences between outcomes, not in the states that those
outcomes represent. Thus, because outcomes are evaluatively signi cant in their own right, a more
appropriate analogy is thinking of @AU and I@AU as two paintings of the same landscape that di er in
value because one is beautiful and one is ugly. Evaluative di erences between paintings do not
supervene on what those paintings represent. It is clearly a mistake to think that two paintings di er in
their degree of beauty only if they di er in what they depict. There are beautiful paintings of ugly
landscapes and ugly paintings of beautiful people. Although paintings are representations, their value
is at least partly independent from what they represent. If expected outcomes are like paintings in this
respect, it’s also a mistake to think that outcomes’ evaluative properties supervene on what they
represent.
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Thus, premise (3) of the Supervenience Argument is false. Normative supervenience is
consistent with de se value. For example, the state of a airs where Clark Kent arrives on the scene is
identical to the one where Superman arrives. Nevertheless, the outcome corresponding to the second
state of a airs exempli es a property that the  rst lacks: the second is an outcome where it’s likely that
the world is saved, relative to Lois’s information. This epistemic property — being such that it’s likely
that the world is saved — is not a property of the state of a airs that both outcomes represent since the
outcomes di er relative to this epistemic property while representing the same state of a airs. Rather,
it’s a descriptive property of the outcome in its own right, qua representation, that makes a
considerable di erence to its value. The property of being de se is similar: a descriptive property of an
outcome that a ects its value.
The analogy between paintings and de se outcomes has limits. There are ugly paintings of
beautiful things and beautiful paintings of ugly things. The analogy thus suggests an unconstrained
relationship between an outcome and the corresponding event or state-of-a airs. But an analogous
decoupling of the value of an outcome from the value of the corresponding event is unappealing;
surely the value of the outcome is at least partly a function of the value of the event.
A second analogy is helpful here. Arpaly and Schroeder (2013) argues that co-referring
representations can di er evaluatively because a particular kind of goodness, good will, depends on
presentational di erences like those that make de se consequentialism tick.27 According to Arpaly and
Schroeder, “complete good will is an intrinsic desire for the right or good, correctly conceptualized.”28.
This account straightforwardly implies that two representational states (in this case, desires) can vary in
value (particularly, in their quality of will) while representing the same state. For example, the desires of
an alien who  nds the  ring of c- bers very unpleasant, like  ngernails scraping over a chalkboard, will
involve the same state of a airs as the desires of a pure-hearted altruist who abhors seeing people in
pain. However, only the altruist’s actions exemplify good will: when the alien is moved to alleviate
someone's su ering, the alien’s deployment of the concept c-fiber firing does not ‘correctly
28 Arpaly and Schroeder (2013: 163), emphasis mine.
27 A referee for Ethics astutely observes that de se value is unusual because it seems to be a kind of
non-instrumental but derivative value. The value of a good will is similar in this respect.
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conceptualize’ the su ering. The quality of the alien’s will is thus worse than the altruist’s, though
both are moved by desires that di er only in how they present a given state. However, the alien’s
actions do not merit praise because of this di erence.
De se consequentialism is similar: simply swap ‘good will’ with ‘de se (dis)value’ and swap
‘merits praise’ with ‘is right’. Arpaly and Schroeder hold that some acts di er in their praiseworthiness
based only on di erences in good will grounded in presentational di erences between desires. De se
consequentialism holds the analogous position that some acts di er in their rightness based only on
di erences in de se value grounded in presentational di erences between outcomes. The value of an
outcome is, therefore, still closely related to what it represents: only outcomes associated with
constraints can exhibit de se value, which can only intensify the badness of a killing. The link between
an outcome’s value and of the corresponding state is far more closely intertwined than the beauty of a
painting and of what it represents.
This analogy between good will and de se value is no coincidence. Julia Driver  nds a structural
similarity between subjective consequentialism and Kantian ethics. She writes,
Subjective forms of consequentialism are also internalist in the same way the Kantian system is,
since on one version of subjective consequentialism, for example, right action is de ned in
terms of expected consequences, and on this version of the subjective view a virtue would be a
disposition to act so as to maximize expected good or to try to maximize the good. Across this
parameter, then, subjective consequentialism and Kantian ethics are the same sort of ethical
theory, whereas subjective and objective consequentialism are radically di erent, as they locate
the source of value very di erently.29
Driver’s observation bears repeating. Kantianism and various subjective consequentialisms, such as de
se consequentialism, share a deep and relatively neglected similarity; they explain facts about moral
29 Driver (2001: 70).
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rightness by facts about the moral signi cance of certain internal mental states.30 Given this
resemblance, it is no wonder that de se consequentialism exhibits features characteristic of
non-consequentialist views like Kantianism, such as constraints. The main di erence between
subjective consequentialism and Kantianism lies in consequentialism’s telic nature. Whether an agent
does what’s right, according to subjective consequentialists, depends only on whether they ‘aim’ at the
right outcomes in action — or, equivalently, whether the agent has the right telic state — not on other
states such as the ‘maxim’ of their action. I return to these observations in section 5.2.
4. De Se Consequentialism and its Competitors
De se consequentialism’s import is mainly negative. It shows that the truth of constraint-supporting
judgments does not entail the falsity of agent-neutral consequentialism, as is widely assumed. In
particular, I have not defended the positive claim that constraints exist. Nevertheless, de se
consequentialism provides indirect support for constraints by suggesting how they amount to more
than mere ‘rule-worship’. For example, if we concede that it’s better that one is killed than that  ve are,
we are faced with a familiar challenge: why not kill the one? Attempting to answer this question “leaves
an ugly stigma.”31 De se consequentialists, however, can dismiss the challenge by denying that it is
better that I (myself) kill one than that the  ve are killed by others. Furthermore, rather than
countervailing evidence against the truth of consequentialism, consequentialists can assert that the
intuitive wrongness of killing one in order to save  ve tracks the badness of you yourself killing. This
allows them to conscript constraint-supporting intuitions as evidence of de se value.
In sum, philosophers attracted to consequentializing feel the pull of both consequentialism’s
compellingness and of their constraint-supporting intuitions. De se consequentialism matters because
it shows that these two claims do not pull in opposite directions. Rather, they pull towards accepting
de se value.
31 Dreier (1993: 24).
30 ‘Internal’ may have to be adjusted to account for factive mental states.
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4.1 Contrasting Agent-Relative Consequentialism and De Se Consequentialism
Contrasting de se consequentialism with agent-relative consequentialism highlights the former’s
appeal. Thomas Hurka alludes to a subtle ambiguity when he describes the “concept of agent-relative
goodness, or what is good from a person’s point of view” (2003: 611). What’s good relative to an agent
and what is good from their point of view di er but can easily be confused. For example, if we meet for
lunch, and I order a soup and you order a sandwich, it might appear that we disagree about what’s
good to order. Or it might appear that we’re using an agent-relative concept,
good-to-order-relative-to-X. However, if it turns out that the waiter has handed me a menu with only
soups on it and that he has handed you one with only sandwiches on it, then what’s good to order
from our di ering points of view di ers, but that doesn’t entail that we have di erent conceptions of
what’s good to order. We needn’t be employing the concept good-to-order-relative-to-X. Rather, we can
be thinking lucidly and consonantly about what’s good to order relative to di erent menus.
The very same mechanism that explains our di erent lunch orders also allows agent-neutral
consequentialists to enact agent-centered constraints. New Schoolers assume that incorporating some
measure of agent-centering in consequentialism requires an agent-centered notion of value. This
assumption is natural for consequentialists characteristically understand rightness through goodness.
As a result, it’s natural to assume that mimicking an agent-centered notion of rightness requires an
agent-centered notion of goodness. But de se value relies on the inherent di erences between agents’
points of view, particularly with respect to de se thought, to enact constraints.
The mechanism is subtle. This is so partly because, at a certain level of abstraction, de se
consequentialism and agent-relative consequentialism involve closely related formalisms. The standard
recipe avoids contradiction in Schroeder’s scenario by distinguishing the evaluative relations that H&F
and J&F stand in, relative to Hans and Jens. Rather than implying the contradiction that H&F>J&F
and J&F>H&F, the standard recipe implies that H&F>JJ&F and J&F>HH&F. A process known
alternately as Currying or Schön nkelization entails that every distinction between relations, like the
standard recipe’s distinction in evaluative relations, is logically equivalent to a distinction in their
relata, like de se consequentialism’s distinction between outcomes like IF and F. For example, we might
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say that the silver medalist exempli es two, distinct monadic properties:
being-next-to-the-gold-medalist and being-next-to-the-bronze-medalist. Currying o ers an equivalent
description. We could instead claim that the silver medalist stands in two instances of the same binary
property being-next-to: once by being next to the gold medalist and again by being next to the bronze
medalist. Currying shows that these two descriptions are logically equivalent: necessarily, you stand in
the ‘next to’ relation to the gold medalist i  you satisfy the monadic property of
being-next-to-the-gold-medalist. Currying the standard recipe distinguishes a particular killing as it
appears as Jens’s outcome from how it appears as Hans’s outcome rather than distinguishing Jens and
Hans’s evaluative standards.
To mimic constraints, consequentialists must hold that “the amount of value a state of a airs
has [varies] from agent to agent.”32 Currying limits what we can vary. In particular, since what an agent
should do is a strict function of which of her available outcomes is best, to mimic constraints we either
have to make available outcomes agent-centered or we have to make value agent-centered. While the
standard recipe makes value agent-centered, de se consequentialism o ers a natural and independently
motivated account of outcomes that are, in a certain sense, agent-centered. In other words,
agent-relative consequentialism varies the value associated with a state of a airs by varying the function
from states of a airs to values from agent to agent. De se consequentialism, by contrast, varies the
outcome associated with that state of a airs from agent to agent. Thus, the main di erence between
the two is that the former makes the evaluation of an outcome agent-relative whereas the latter makes
the outcome itself agent-relative.
While perhaps formally trivial, this di erence is philosophically substantive. Agent-relative
consequentialism’s main challenge, as we’ve seen, is squaring agent-relative goodness with the
‘compelling’ consequentialist idea that it’s never wrong to do what’s best. De se consequentialism, in
contrast, does not make evaluation agent-relative. It makes what’s evaluated agent-relative. So it uses
‘good’ in the sense expressed by the compelling consequentialist thought that it’s never wrong to do
what’s best.
32 Oddie and Milne (1991: 44).
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As a result, de se consequentialism does not involve a novel kind of value. It involves only a
novel value bearer. My invitation to consider de se value thus resembles an egalitarian’s invitation to
consider the (agent-neutral) value of equality. Utilitarians may decline the invitation, but not because
the value allegedly exhibited by equality is unintelligible. Utilitarians simply doubt that equality has
familiar, intelligible agent-neutral value. Similarly, when I claim that de se killings are worse than their
de se counterparts, I mean that the di erence makes the former worse in the familiar way that other
bad-making features do. Worries about intelligibility, such as those that a ict >X do not apply to de se
value.
Moreover, de se consequentialism’s sensitivity to presentational di erences is a considerable
advantage over agent-relative consequentialism in cases of de se or indexical confusion, such as the
grocery case above. For example, forms of consequentialism imply that you should give away the
grocery prize only if they recognize a di erence between you getting the prize and the woman in the
other queue (who happens to be you) getting the prize. But once we recognize that di erence, we no
longer need agent-relative value to reconcile consequentialism and constraints, as I’ve shown above.
Nevertheless, de se consequentialism’s advantage in vindicating the compelling consequentialist
thought can be doubted.33 That thought is compelling partly because when something is
agent-neutrally best, then it’s best in a public or non-parochial way. However, if some outcomes are
private, then their value, it might be thought, is private. So even if de se consequentialism complies with
the letter of the compelling thought, it might seem to violate its spirit.
This impression is misled. For example, your qualitative experience of your own happiness may
be inaccessible to me but that does not diminish its authority over what I should do in a utilitarian
account of moral obligation. Though your experience of happiness is private, the authority of its value
is public. Likewise, though, necessarily, a de se outcome is accessible to only a single agent, the outcome
is not good or bad only for her. It is good or bad in a public, agent-neutral way.
33 I thank a referee for Ethics for pressing me to clarify my position here.
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Outcomes’ privacy, however, is incompatible with a second appealing feature of
consequentialism, beyond the compelling thought.34 Consequentialism is appealing for social policy
work because it o ers a simple way for value to be added up across persons. However, if my de se
outcomes are outcomes only for me, then their value cannot be straightforwardly aggregated from the
policy-maker’s point of view: from that perspective, your de se outcome is a third-personal outcome.
As a result, de se value ‘disappears’ when considered from a third-personal point of view. De se value
cannot, therefore, be part of policy or public decision-making.
This concern is a feature of constraints themselves, not of de se consequentialism per se. On a
simple deontological framework, the wrongness of my killing matters to my decision making in a way
that it doesn’t matter to your decision making and vice versa. Thus, this shortcoming appears to be
inherent to constraints themselves, a icting any way of enacting them, not just de se
consequentialism’s particular method of doing so.
De se value might seem to violate the spirit of the compelling thought in a di erent sense.
Following Scanlon’s (1998) buck-passing analysis of value, suppose that, necessarily, something is
agent-neutrally bad just when there is su cient agent-neutral reason to disvalue it. Following
Schroeder (2007), suppose that, necessarily, there is su cient agent-neutral reason to disvalue
something just when there is su cient reason for anyone to disvalue it. Thus, if the outcome where I
kill has de se (dis)value, then everyone has a reason to disvalue me myself killing. And that’s very odd if
only I can think the thoughts involved in that outcome.
While odd, this implication is not fatal. Although the de se (dis)value of me myself killing gives
a reason for anyone to disvalue that outcome, only I am in a position to act on it.35 The outcome falls
under the sphere of my agency and no one else’s. Insofar as the implication is odd, it is benign.
35 My position echoes those taken by Wedgwood and Broome on a similar issue, as reported in Schroeder (2011:
33).
34 I am grateful to [redacted] for discussion here.
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4.2 De Se Thoughts, Centered Worlds, and Properties
There are, in principle, as many ways to Curry the standard recipe as there are ways of individuating
outcomes by agents. For example, Campbell Brown and Jamie Dreier each explore mimicking
constraints by distributing value over centered worlds or properties, which Lewis (1979) uses to model
de se content. Yet I’ve chosen to Curry the standard recipe using de se thoughts, without mention of
centered worlds or properties. It’s natural to wonder whether that choice is sound.
While centered worlds or properties help make de se thought formally tractable, focusing on
them in this context obscures de se consequentialism’s most important feature: private outcomes. As
we’ve just seen, de se consequentialism can mimic constraints only because some of its outcomes are
private. Their privacy follows from the assumption that some outcomes are de se thoughts and that all
de se thoughts are private. Once we understand how some outcomes are de se thoughts, private
outcomes follow naturally.
However, rather than distinguishing directly between  rst- and third-personal thoughts, we
could instead distinguish between ordered pairs taken to represent those thoughts, as Jamie Dreier
(2011; 2020) does. While this paper owes much to his work, applying Lewis’s centered-worlds
approach to the project of consequentializing is more hindrance than help. Some (principally
Cappelen and Dever (2013) and Magidor (2015)) have o ered potent criticisms of Lewis’s approach.
These criticisms suggest that Lewis’s account relies not only on centered worlds or properties but also
on an allegedly cryptic hyperintensional notion of self-predication.
To see this, suppose for reductio that self-predication is merely intensional — that is, agent x
predicating property F of x su ces for x to self-predicate F. Now suppose that Heimson is deceived
about his own beliefs. Although he believes that he’s Hume, the cognitive dissonance of that false
belief has put Heimson in denial. As a result, Heimson does not believe that he himself believes that
he’s Hume. If H is Heimson’s set of beliefs then a Lewisian centered worlds approach implies:36
1. {<w,x>: w∈ [Heimson is Hume] and x=Heimson}⊆H
2. {<w,x>: w∈ [Heimson believes that he is Hume] and x=Heimson} ⊄H
36 Strictly speaking, the center must also include a time but that complexity does not rescue the account. See Liao
(2012) on this point.
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One day he sees a handsome stranger in line at the grocery store wearing a dashing pink velvet turban.
Heimson recognizes the turban from the well-known portrait of Hume. The man must have chosen to
don the turban, Heimson reasons, inferring that he must think that he’s Hume. However, Heimson
fails to notice that he’s looking at his own re ection. The stranger is Heimson himself. Consequently:
3. {<w,x>: w∈ [He is Hume] and x=Heimson} ⊄H
4. {<w,x>: w∈ [He believes that he is Hume] and x=Heimson}⊆H
Since ‘he’ refers to Heimson, for all worlds w, w∈ [He is Hume] i  w∈ [Heimson is Hume] and w
∈ [Heimson believes that he is Hume] i  w∈ [He believes that he is Hume]. As a result, (1-4) are
inconsistent. Therefore, centered worlds, all by themselves, don’t seem to capture the di erence
between  rst-personal and non- rst-personal thought.As Liao (2012: 314) puts it, “there seems to be a
fundamental conceptual distinction between ascribing properties to oneself and ascribing properties to
an individual possessing a unique and exhaustive list of non-trivial properties.”
If challenges like the one above from Cappelen and Dever (2013) and Magidor (2015) are
sound, Lewis’s account requires a special kind of self-predication. Working only with centered
contents, at least as they are conventionally understood, seems to fall short of capturing the nuances of
de se belief. And since private outcomes depend on the nuances of de se belief, employing centered
worlds to model the outcomes involved in consequentialism at best obfuscates how to reconcile
consequentialism and constraints. At worst, employing centered worlds rather de se thoughts fails to
reconcile them altogether.
Indeed, because of this obfuscation, Campbell Brown (2011) is misled into denying that
constraints and consequentialism are consistent. He begins by assuming that the outcome of an action
is an entire world.37 Then, to explore agent-relativity, he pairs worlds with individuals. He writes, “If
the centered worlds <x, i> and <y, j> are centered on di erent people (i.e., if i≠j) then they make no
37 In Brown (2011: 753-4), Campbell Brown explicitly excludes consequentialisms that rely on “subjective
probabilities”, such as de se consequentialism, on the grounds that he is interested in objective, not subjective,
rightness. But theories of objective rightness that incorporate subjective probabilities are perfectly consistent. So
Brown’s interest in objective rightness does not diminish de se consequentialism’s relevance to his project. I am
neutral on whether de se consequentialism explains objective rather than subjective rightness.
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di erence to whether [a theory of what’s right maximizes value]” (759).38 That’s true: individuating
outcomes by individuals does not, all by itself, reconcile consequentialism and constraints. After all,
regardless of how we evaluate things, some set of centered worlds will have maximal disvalue and, other
things equal, the consequentialist theory will permit agents to kill in order to avoid them. Only if the
very worst outcomes are private, as de se thoughts are, can we be sure that we’ll never have to kill in
order to avoid them. But thinking of outcomes as centered worlds obscures their privacy, which is what
misleads Brown.
He concludes with the following re ection:
This way of trying to accommodate agent-relative theories within consequentialism
therefore fails. To be clear, I do not claim that agent-relative views are incoherent. I
claim only that they are incompatible with the view that there is a single thing, the
good, that we all ought to maximize. Such views are better thought of as saying that
there are many things that ought to be maximized, a di erent one for each of us. (763)
Brown is, as I’ve just argued, mistaken to claim that views like de se consequentialism are “incompatible
with the view that there is a single thing, the good, that we all ought to maximize”. Moreover, his claim
that “such views are better thought of as saying that there are many things that ought to be maximized,
a di erent one for each of us” is ambiguous. De se consequentialism is not “better thought of as saying
that there are many [kinds of value] that ought to be maximized, a di erent [value] for each of us.” Its
key claim is “that there are many [sets of outcomes whose value] ought to be maximized, a di erent
[set] for each of us.”
38 Brown assumes that a theory of what’s right is consequentialized by a theory of value just when what’s right
(R) for an individual (i) given a set of options (A) — that is, when Ri(A) — is the most valuable (grt≤) option in
A — that is, when Ri(A) = grt≤(A). However, if ought implies can in at least one sense of can, then the only
options that can be right for an agent are ones choosable by that agent. So we should relativize A to individuals,
yielding Ai, and instead hold that a theory of value grt≤ consequentializes a theory of right (R) just when Ri(Ai) =
grt≤(Ai). If options vary between individuals in the way that de se consequentialism suggests, then it’s possible
that Ri(Ai) = grt≤(Ai).
26
In sum, de se consequentialism achieves constraints by varying outcomes between individuals,
not by varying kinds of value. De se consequentialism is thus best understood as the view that the
absolute, agent-neutrally worst thing, to which all other outcomes are preferable, is a de se killing. But
your de se killings are never my outcomes nor vice versa.
5. Fault Lines in Ethical Theory
5.1 Companions in Guilt
De se consequentialism is noteworthy not just for consequentialists sympathetic to constraints, but also
for anyone interested in what we can call, following Nair (2014; 2020), the fault lines that divide
various positions in ethics. For example, in his in uential “Structures of Normative Theories” and in
subsequent work, Jamie Dreier defends the claim, which I have defended here, that the
agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction is orthogonal to the consequentialist/non-consequentialist
distinction: accepting agent-relativity in ethics does not require rejecting consequentialism. However,
this claim might be taken to diminish the importance of the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction,
which, philosophers largely agree, is one of the “greatest contributions of recent ethics.”39 So it’s worth
asking whether constraints trace a genuine fault line in ethics. I will argue that they do, just not the
fault line between consequentialism and non-consequentialism.
I’ll focus in this  nal section on identifying and defending one claim in particular: that claims
expressing agent-centered constraints typically — perhaps necessarily —involve indexical terms,
particularly ‘I’. Doing so shows that de se value is noteworthy not only because it grounds a
consequentialist account of constraints, explaining why they might amount to more than mere
‘rule-worship’. It also illuminates how any moral theory that posits constraints thereby attribute moral
signi cance to di erences like the one between  rst- and third-personal thought. As we will see,
drawing out the essential indexicality of many agent-centered constraints supports Darwall (1986)’s
distinction between ethical theories that start from the ‘point of view of the universe’ and those that
39 Hurka (2003: 628).
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start from the agent’s point of view — or, as he puts it, theories that start from the ‘inside-out’ and
those that start from the ‘outside-in’.
This fault line merits attention not only for its own sake but also because it provides a
‘companions in guilt’ defense of de se value. De se value is at least prima facie puzzling. But it is merely
the consequentialist aspect of the puzzle that agent-centered constraints pose for any ethical theory,
whether consequentialist or not. Moral theories, as we’ll now see, seem to require attributing moral
signi cance to what I’ve been calling presentational di erences to enact constraints. Insofar as de se
value is odd, therefore, that’s only because agent-centered constraints are odd. The oddity of de se value
o ers an argument against constraints themselves, not their expression in de se consequentialism.
Deontological and reasons-based ethical frameworks, which are often taken as competitors to
consequentialism, express constraints as follows:40
1. It is always wrong to kill.
2. There is never most reason to kill.
Neither claim explicitly mentions an agent. This is essential, for one important role of constraints is to
o er practical or deliberative guidance about how to act. However, stating (1) with an agent, as in (3)
below, undercuts its practical guidance:
3. It is always wrong that anyone kills.
For example, in cases like Mafia, it is certain that someone will kill. Consequently, (3) o ers no
practical guidance on whether to kill in Mafia since killing is unavoidable. In contrast, (1) tells us what
to do: not kill, even if someone else will. Similarly for (2).
As a special case of (3), (4) also fails to play constraints’ practical role:
4. It is always wrong for @AU to kill/ that @AU kills.
I’ve introduced ‘@AU’ as a name for me, the actual author of the article. As such, it’s natural to
suppose that a constraint on killing, as it applies to me, is captured by something like (4). But (4) omits
40 Hammerton (2020) discusses various logically distinct formulations of constraints. Although grammatically
distinct, (1) and (2) above are roughly analogous to his formulation #4, with the caveat that I have assumed that
the correct treatment of de nunc outcomes in a consequentialist framework parallels de se consequentialism’s
treatment of de se outcomes.
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the  rst-person, making it susceptible to de se confusion, such as when I doubt that I’m @AU, which
undercuts (4)’s practical guidance.41 For example, suppose that I accept (4), that it is always wrong for
@AU to kill. But suppose that I don’t know that I am @AU. When faced with an apparent choice
between killing someone or having @AU kill them and I doubt that I am @AU, I will infer that I may
kill since it is always wrong that @AU kills, which is inconsistent with a constraint on killing.
The di erence is that (1) and (2), in contrast to (3) and (4), use a non- nite clause, namely, ‘to
kill’. Non- nite clauses in environments like (1) and (2) tacitly involve  rst-personal thought by
covertly expressing a generic  rst-personal pronoun tied to the de se, making them equivalent to ‘it is
always wrong that you yourself kill’ and ‘there is always most reason that you yourself not kill’.42 This is a
general feature of to-clauses embedded under null grammatical subjects.43 For example, ‘It is good to see
you again’, as uttered by me, expresses that it is good that I myself see you again. Consequently, as
others have noted, deontological and reasons-based theories don’t incorporate agent-centered
restrictions simply because of their apparent focus on actions.44 Rather, (1) and (2) are agent-centered
because they incorporate a covert indexical element tied to the  rst person. That is, what makes these
restrictions agent-centered is that they’re essentially indexical.
With (1) and (2)’s covert de se sense made explicit, we’re in a better position to appreciate a
deep similarity between the three accounts of agent-centered constraints:
5. De Se Consequentialist: It is always the worst outcome [that you yourself kill].
6. Conventional Deontology: It is always wrong [that you yourself kill].
44 For example, Dougherty (2013) articulates an ostensibly agent-neutral deontology. I doubt that such a view is
possible, largely for the arguments given above and for those advanced by Hammerton (2017).
43 For a comprehensive defense, see Moltmann (2005), with important antecedents in Chierchia (1990). PRO
generally inherits its referent from the sentence’s grammatical subject, but in sentences with null subjects like (1)
and (2) it takes on an arbitrary referent, which, Moltmann argues, is necessarily interpreted de se.
42 It is widely acknowledged that to-clauses in environments like (1) and (2) express a covert anaphoric or deictic
pronoun, PRO. Stanley and Williamson (2001), for just one example, exploit this observation to defend
intellectualism about know-how.
41 Dreier (2020) discusses similar cases of ‘indexical uncertainty’. He aims to show that views like de se
consequentialism encode strictly more information than views like agent-relative consequentialism and that
such information is not “junk information”. I believe the arguments above support his claims.
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7. Reasons-Based: There is never most reason [that you yourself kill].
The three approaches are distinguished only by the normative property or concept that they privilege:
value for consequentialists, norms or rules for deontologists, and reasons for the third. Each enacts the
agent-centered constraint on killing by attributing the maximal negative moral status (e.g., ‘always
worst’, ‘always wrong’, ‘always most reason to not’) to the  rst-personal state of you yourself killing.
As a result, each faces the uncomfortable questions that may make de se value seem odd. In
particular, if morality applies to each agent impartially, why should an agent attribute special moral
signi cance to her killings? For example, (6) attributes wrongness only to killings that you yourself
perform. Likewise, (7) implies that your killings are uniquely disfavored by the normative reasons that
matter. These implications are puzzling because they indicate a profound and obscure moral
asymmetry between oneself and others, which con icts with morality’s apparent impartiality. But the
con ict is rooted in the nature of constraints, not in the moral theories themselves.
De se value is, therefore, the species of a genus. A wide range of moral theories attribute special
moral signi cance to  rst-personal thoughts in order to enact action-guiding constraints.
Consequentialists argue that value exhausts moral signi cance. As a result, consequentialists attribute a
novel kind of value to these thoughts, de se value. But de se value is not clearly more implausible than
these other ways of interpreting the moral signi cance of the de se. To be sure, there may be special
reasons for thinking that agent-neutral value is particularly ill-suited to capturing the moral signi cance
of de se (and, more broadly, indexical) thought, but those reasons are not obvious. This is a question
for future research.
The apparent essential indexicality of some agent-centered constraints, regardless of our
favoured moral theory, also helps explain observations that others have made about their logical
structure. Following McNaughton and Rawling (1995a; 1995b) and re nements by, inter alia,
Portmore (2001) and Hammerton (2020), agent-centered constraints possess a distinctive distribution
of agent-referring variables. This characterization of constraints harmonizes with my claim that
constraints are essentially indexical. But beyond that harmony, the idea that agent-centered constraints
are essentially indexical improves on the variable-based account in at least two ways. First, it shows that
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having the appropriate agent-referring variables is necessary but not su cient for being agent-centered;
the referents of those variables must be understood  rst-personally or be undermined by cases of de se
confusion. Second, the essential indexicality of some agent-centered constraints explains why such rules
are uni ed by that particular distribution of variables: that distribution is necessary for the rule to be
understood  rst-personally, which is necessary, as I’ve just argued, for interpreting it as an
agent-centered constraint.
Finally, the essential indexicality of constraints would explain why “it is at least sometimes
impermissible to violate [a constraint] in circumstances where a violation would serve to minimize
total overall violations of the very same restriction, and would have no other morally relevant
consequences”. If constraints are essentially indexical, there is an asymmetry between my killing and
your killing, from my perspective, and between your killing and mine, from your perspective, which
explains why a killing by one person cannot o set a killing by another. For example, I can’t o set the
(de se) badness of my killing by preventing the de se disvalue that would obtain from your killing. The
de se disvalue of your killings is never part of my outcomes. Thus, I am never in a position to reduce the
amount of de se disvalue (or failure to respect one’s reasons or wrongness) that you put into the world,
nor vice versa.
5.2  Ethics from the Inside-Out
Two points from the preceding discussion merit particular attention. First, enacting constraints
requires the kind of information that appears only from the agent’s point of view; it is therefore the
universe’s point of view, often assumed by consequentialists, that is incompatible with constraints, not
consequentialism itself.
Second, more complex (but no less consequentialist) forms of consequentialism, like some
subjective ones, allow constraints when they take the agent’s point of view. Normative concepts like
good are, therefore, more plastic than theorists typically suppose. A given ethical theory’s  rst-order
permissions and prohibitions are shaped more by its point of view than by its preferred  avour of
normativity. Thus, the traditional fault lines between ethical theories traced by their privileged
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normative concept (rights, goodness, virtuous character, reasons, etc.) may not carve at the most
central ethical joints. Class ethical theories by whether they adopt the agent’s point of view or whether
they adopt what has been called, variously, Sidgwick’s “point of view of the universe”, Nagel’s “point
of view of nowhere”, or Williams’ “absolute conception of the world” cuts at a deeper joint.
A distinct route leads Stephen Darwall to a similar conclusion. He traces a fault line between
ethical theories that start from the ‘outside-in’ and those that start from the ‘inside-out’, writing:
To put it in a rough and preliminary way, moral integrity involves a person’s guiding his life by
his own moral judgment, properly understood, and the fundamental responsibility of the
moral life is the maintenance of integrity, so conceived. Instead of beginning outside the moral
agent with a view about states of a airs that are intrinsically worthy of promotion, the
alternative begins inside the moral agent with a view about moral character and integrity. The
rationale for agent-centered restrictions is itself agent-centered.45
Darwall’s point is this. Some values don’t appear in states of a airs, considered apart from the point of
view of particular agents.46 If we start theorizing about morality using only those states of a airs, and
we are willing to recognize no values apart from those that appear in them — if we theorize about
morality “from the outside-in”, as Darwall puts it — then values that are visible only to agents, like
integrity, seem puzzling. For example, if we start theorizing about a painting’s beauty without the
painting itself or a photo of it, but rather with a (very long) numerical readout specifying the location
and velocity of each particle that makes up the painting, it’s going to be very di cult, perhaps
impossible, to judge whether the painting is beautiful using only the readout. The painting’s beauty
46 Darwall’s claims echo some of Locke’s claims about secondary qualities. Secondary qualities are, roughly,
dispositions of particulars to cause certain perceptual reactions in creatures like us. For example, properties like
being loud or being crimson are secondary qualities but the sound and light wavelengths associated with them
are not. Whether secondary qualities exist is controversial. But many philosophers, such as Wiggins (1987: 107),
McDowell (1998: 112-150), Wright (1988), and Lillehammer (2007: 89-110) have found it fruitful to analogize
moral value with them. I also pursue this analogy above.
45 Darwall (1986: 305).
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won’t appear when approaching it from the ‘outside-in’. Rather, we must behold the painting with our
own eyes, from our own perspective, to apprehend its beauty. The same holds true for de se value as a
kind of moral ugliness. De se value does not appear when we examine what de se thoughts represent. It
emerges only when we think the thoughts themselves. So it makes a great di erence whether ethical
theorizing starts from the point of view of the universe, which excludes or prescinds from indexical
thought, or from the point of view of a particular agent, which is constituted by it.
Objective consequentialism is a paradigmatically ‘outside-in’ approach to ethics. It limits itself
to only those evaluative features that belong intrinsically to states of a airs. If Darwall is right, those
features cannot provide a rationale for agent-centered constraints; we cannot justify constraints if we
begin theorizing from the point of view of the universe and begin thinking about value from the
‘outside-in’.
Consequently, to vindicate constraints we must approach them from the ‘inside-out’, and
exploit indexical features that appear only from an agent’s point of view. As I’ve argued, it should be
unsurprising, then, that capturing constraints using outcomes requires positing evaluative features of
outcomes that are not evaluative features of the states that those outcomes represent. Since
representations mediate agents’ engagement with the world, constituting their point of view on it, it is
natural to exploit, for example, beauty, an evaluative feature characteristic of representations, to explain
agent-centered constraints from the ‘inside-out’.
Recognizing this fault line is especially important because it explains the mistaken insistence
that consequentialism is incompatible with constraints. If we assume that every consequentialist theory
is an outside-in theory, then constraints and consequentialism are indeed incompatible; constraints
appear only from the inside-out. But consequentialism is not essentially an outside-in approach. If we
begin consequentialist theorizing from the agent’s point of view, in the manner of subjective
consequentialism and of de se consequentialism in particular, then a consequentialist justi cation for
something like agent-centered constraints is achievable through de se value.
Nevertheless, an apparent tension divides de se value and the axiology that standardly
underpins consequentialism, which often regards value as, roughly, what’s desirable ‘from the point of
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view of the universe’ or from the outside-in.47 ‘The point of view of the universe’ o ers an appealing
perspective on value because it  xes a standard of correctness or objectivity for evaluation. Objectivity
might thus seem essential to agent-neutral value. Correspondingly, because de se value is invisible from
that point of view, its objectivity might be doubted. And if de se value lacks objectivity, it might seem
like a merely covert form of agent-relative value.
De se consequentialists can respond by appealing to an ancient source of objectivity in ethics:
the phronimos or practically wise agent. One standard formulation of virtue ethics holds, very roughly,
that you should act in some way just when and because the phronimos would act that way in your
position. Practical wisdom provides the objective standard against which an act’s rightness is judged.
We can extend that standard to ground de se value’s objectivity by holding that one outcome is
agent-neutrally better than another just when and because the phronimos would prefer the  rst to the
second, were she (per impossible) in your shoes and knew only as much as you do now. To be sure,
response-dependent accounts of value like this face well-known challenges, such as the Euthyphro. But
these challenges are no more daunting than the challenge of explicating what ‘the point of view of the
universe’ is. Consequently, de se consequentialists can vindicate the objectivity of de se value by
grounding that value in the point of view of a privileged agent, rather than that of a universe.
6. Conclusion
De se consequentialism employs agent-neutral value and agent-centered outcomes to enact constraints.
Consequently, it provides a counterexample to the claim that “rankings of outcomes will need to be
agent-relative […] in order to consequentialize certain non-consequentialist theories.” To enact
constraints, de se consequentialism implies that some de se outcomes are worse than their
third-personal counterparts. This may seem puzzling. Nevertheless, I have argued that it is no more
surprising than parallel implications from competing non-consequentialist theories and that it has
precedent in a familiar evaluative property, beauty.
47 I thank a referee for Ethics for pressing me to clarify my position here.
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